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Abstract
This study inspires from Smith Moral Sentiment Theory 
which recognizes moral as the essential motive for every 
human action. The purpose of this study is to prove the 
relationship between ethical principle and corporate 
governance. This study employs case-study approach 
comprising three Malaysian cases. Each case will be 
analyzed parallel to the governance principle of promoting 
the best interest for the company. Board of directors (BOD) 
is emphasized throughout this study due to the important 
role of BOD in the structure of corporate governance. 
This study suggests that in order to execute corporate 
governance effectively, it must be based on ethical 
principles. As a result, ethical principles are included in 
the corporate governance rules as reflected by the terms 
of “proper purpose”, “in good faith in the best interest of 
the company”, “reasonable care” and “diligence”. These 
terms contain subjective and relative meaning. For this 
study, corporate governance rule cannot be separated 
from the confinement pillars of ethical principles. Thus, 
the study reiterates Smith argument that moral sentiment 
should underly human economic activities, including the 
jurisdiction of corporate management.
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INTRODUCTION
Most studies on corporate governance are focusing on 
the relationship of governance mechanisms and the 
companies’ performance or shares’ prices (Heaney, 2009; 
Neeraj and Arun, 2005; Setia-Atmajaya, 2008 and de 
Andres et al., 2005). Company’s performance and shares’ 
prices have been used as they reflect the results from the 
entire governance process. However, there is a gap in 
corporate governance studies in terms of investigation on 
ethics and corporate governance relationship.
One of the most important governance mechanisms 
lies in the roles of directors. The directors are elected to 
perform fiduciary duties with respect to the upholding of 
the company’s interest. Some obligations of the directors 
are outlined legislatively in the Malaysia Companies 
Act 1965. However, the assumptions that the directors 
are naturally acting in the best interest of the companies 
is rather simplistic. Therefore, in lights of Smith Moral 
Sentiment Theory this study aims to prove the inter-related 
relationship between ethics and corporate governance. As 
far as ethics and governance are concern, the relationship 
of the two concepts is expected to be related to each other 
rather than substituting one another.  
1.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
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Globalization allows freedom of capital movement 
throughout the world. Domestic and foreign investment 
is particularly important to provide sufficient resources 
for the development process. Thus, the ability to provide 
reasonable assurance of investment accountability and 
returns has formed the basis in rational investment 
decision-making. Investors’ confidence towards the 
prevailing structures of corporate governance and 
practices would determine their willingness to participate 
in particular capital market (Skousen et al., 2005). This 
relationship can be induced from the evolution of US 
corporate regulations way back in 1930s. Before the 
securities’ market crash in 1929, there was relatively 
little support for government regulation in US securities 
markets due to business deregulation policy (Sridharan 
et al., 2002). Since then, public confidence in securities 
market had declined. As a result, US government had 
introduced the Securities Act in 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act in 1934 in order to restore public’s faith 
by providing the capital market with structure and 
oversight mechanism.  In 2002, the Congress passed a 
new act known as the Sarbanes Oxley Act due to the 
sudden collapsed of Enron Corporation in 2001. The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 had been enacted to protect 
public investors and regain investors’ confidence through 
improvement of the financial reporting transparency. Thus, 
protection of investors’ right and investment is becoming 
increasingly important in the era of globalization.
Severe economic downturn has contributed towards the 
increasing effort to improve and upgrade the governance 
structure in most countries. For example, corporate 
governance has emerged to be an important issue since 
the aftermath of 1997 Asian economic crisis (Backman, 
2006). In Australia, the corporate governance issue 
has intensified since 2001 due to occurrence of major 
corporate collapse and scandals in the country. Corporate 
governance (CG) can be defined as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled” (Skousen et al., 
2005). In Malaysia, the Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance (2001) describes CG as “the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and 
affairs of the company towards enhancing business 
prosperity and corporate accountability. The ultimate aim 
is to realize long-term shareholder value, whilst taking 
into account the interest of other stakeholders”. Hence, 
establishment of laws and regulations is indeed important 
to secure management obedience and to gain public 
investors’ confident (Lamoreaux, 2009; Skousen et al., 
2005 and Dellaportas, 2005). In addition, according to La 
Porta et al (1998 and 2000), the existence of laws and its 
implementation by the regulators and court is essential 
to the corporate governance and financial management. 
La Porta et al (2000) noted that countries which are 
based on common law rules usually have the strongest 
level of investors’ protection (La Porta et al., 2000 and 
1998). Consequently, laws and regulations are recognized 
as the most important source of corporate governance 
mechanism in most countries especially in a common law 
based country such as Malaysia.   
In terms of model, there are two dominant CG models, 
known as the Anglo-Saxon Model and the European 
Continental Model (OOghe and Langhe, 2002; Neeraj 
and Arun, 2005; and Setia-Atmajaya, 2008). Both 
models differ in the nature of its control mechanism. The 
Anglo-Saxon model emphasizes on the use of external 
control (market mechanism) such as role of institutional 
investors and the threat of merger and take-over; while 
the European Continental Model relies on internal control 
mechanism such as directors’ remuneration, board 
composition and management performance based-reward 
(Setia-Atmajaya, 2008). The choice of model depends on 
the type of capital market which is specifically determined 
by the level of investors’ ownership concentration and 
power over the management. Nevertheless, the board of 
directors is recognized as important players in both CG 
models.  
Boards are considered as the institutions that 
mitigate the effects of agency problems existent in the 
organizations (Khongmalai et al., 2010: 618; Neeraj 
and Arun, 2005: 163; Setia-Atmajaya, 2008: 332 and de 
Andres et al., 2005: 198). The boards are accountable with 
some fiduciary duties including formulating corporate 
policies, approving strategic plans, authorizing major 
transactions and the sale of additional securities and 
declaring dividend which finally impact the future of 
particular organizations. However, according to Hart 
(1995) and de Andres et al. (2005), the effectiveness of 
board of directors is in doubt for some reasons. Although 
there are ways to improve its effectiveness, it is unlikely 
able to solve the agency problems entirely. Thus, this 
derives a question whether governance rules is sufficient 
to ensure that the directors perform their task effectively? 
In other words, is it possible for the directors to perform 
their fiduciary duty independently from ethical value? As 
a result, this article will discuss deliberately these issues 
by focusing on governance provisions in the Malaysia 
Companies Act 1965 and to comprehend the necessary 
premise for directors in performing their fiduciary duties 
through observation on selected corporate cases in 
Malaysia.
1.1  Moral Sentiment Theory
The premise underlying this study originates from Smith 
Moral Sentiment Theory. Although Smith was well-
known of his economic theories, it is also important 
to acknowledge that he had devoted his early scholar 
activities promoting idea of virtues and ethics. Since 
1959, his moral idea has been published through Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. Smith proposed that the sense of 
propriety as the basic motive to govern all range of human 
activities including their economic activities. According 
to Smith, “pity or compassion is the emotion in which a 
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person feel the misery of others either when they see it or 
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner” (Smith, 
1976, p.10).  
According to Smith (1976, p.62) there are two different 
ways for people to obtain respect and glory which will 
finally mould their character or behaviours.  The ways are:
(1) Study of wisdom and practice of virtue
(2) Acquisition of wealth and greatness
The first way will lead to conscious and deliberate 
move of actions that place goodness to the systems.  It 
deters scrupulous greed and selfishness motive from 
human’s choice of actions or behaviours. They will 
fulfil their wishes or desires through moderate and 
cautious actions rather that emphasizing their ambition 
by expropriating others’ interest. However, according to 
Smith, “many man places his glory in being thought rich, 
without considering that the duties which that reputation 
imposes upon him, must soon reduce him to beggary, and 
render his situation still more unlike that of those whom 
he admires and imitates, that it had been glory” (1976, 
p.64). Smith contended that most people viewed wealth 
and richness as the popular way to obtain respect and 
greatness in their society. Therefore, wisdom and virtues 
have become unpopular to most people and Smith had 
described it in his own statement as “...They desired to be 
praised for what they do not think praise-worthy, and are 
ashamed of unfashionable virtues which they sometimes 
practice in secret, and for which they have secretly some 
degree of real veneration. There are hypocrites of wealth 
and greatness, as well as religion and virtue; and a vain 
man is as apt to pretend to be what he is not, in the one 
way, as a cunning man is in the other..” (1976, 64)  Virtue 
can be placed into human action through proper means 
of approbation value which is confined in the domain of 
propriety sense. The most important source of propriety 
sense comes in the feeling of pity or sympathy to others. 
H o w e v e r ,  S m i t h  e c o n o m i c  i d e a  h a s  b e e n 
misinterpreted due to the abandonment of the moral 
sentiment. As a result, the abandonment of moral motive 
has led to over-emphasizing on utility rather than moral as 
the approbation value in human economic choices (Macfie 
1959; Coker 1990; and Gramp 1948). This view has been 
noted from Smith statement, “..Every affection is useful 
when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; 
and every affection is disadvantages when it exceeds the 
proper bounds. According to this system therefore, virtue 
consists not in any one affection, but in the proper degree 
of all affections. The only difference between it and which 
I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes 
utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection 
of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this 
proper degree” (1976, p. 306). Thus, the abandon of moral 
sentiment theory has also lea to deception behaviours 
among corporate agents which praise pleasure of wealth 
and greatness in an isolated perspective. This is in line 
with Coker (1990) and Grampp (1948) ideas which 
believe Smith’s concept of moral sentiment as essential 
components of the human personality which are vital to 
proper interpretation of the economic man of the Wealth 
of Nations.  
Within the moral frame in the concept of economic 
man, the economic system has made to havoc due to 
incessant business failures characterized by various 
corporate insiders misdeeds (Lamoreaux, 2009). The 
insiders of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, 
Adelphia Communications and a number of major U.S 
companies were found out to use a variety of accounting 
tricks to cover up deals that had benefited themselves 
personally and seriously harm the companies.  Lamoreaux 
(2009) referred the expropriation of companies by greed 
(or power-hungry) managers (inside threats) as Type 
1 problem of corporate governance. In such condition, 
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has gained 
its most credits as it offers the theoretical basis for 
explaining cunning opportunist behaviours as well as 
arrays of possible mechanisms to minimize its occurrence 
(Kulik 2005; Daily et.al., 2003; and Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996). According to Daily et al. (2003, p. 372), the 
popularity of Agency Theory in governance research is 
due to two factors:
a) It is an extremely simple theory in which large 
corporations are reduced to two participants, managers 
and shareholders; and
b) The notion of humans as self-interested and 
generally unwilling to sacrifice personal interest for the 
interest of others is widely spread for ages.  
Agency Theory has assumed that management as the 
opportunist agents and thus requires constant monitoring 
from various type of monitoring tools (Culpan and 
Trsussel, 2005; Ghoshal, 2005; Kidder, 2005; Kulik, 
2005; Jones and Pollitt, 1996; Adams, 1994; and Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In lights of Agency Theory, various 
monitoring tools which are ultimately related to corporate 
governance have been established and constantly improved 
in order to minimize agents’ opportunist behaviours. 
Previous studies within domain of corporate governance 
mechanisms have been focusing on the role of board of 
directors with specific emphasise on parameters such as 
board sizes, board compositions, board independency 
and boards’ structures and functions (Hearney, 2009; 
Setia-Atmajaya, 2008; de Andres et.al, 2005; Neeraj 
and Arun, 2005; Daily et al., 2003; and Jongmoo et al., 
2007). However, this study will not be in the stream of 
investigating the results or effectiveness of governance 
mechanism within the frame of Agency Theory, but to 
provide evidence on the intertwining relationship between 
ethics and fiduciary duties of directors through qualitative 
investigation within the context of Smith moral sentiment 
theory. This is in line with Neeraj and Arun (2005) who 
suggested future researcher to conduct study on the 
qualitative aspect of BOD as it may have impact on the 
firm value. Thus, ethical value is the qualitative aspect that 
114Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures 115
is worth studying.  In addition, this study also parallels to 
Daily et al. (2003) who viewed that corporate governance 
research should attempt to consider alternative theoretical 
perspectives rather than solely base on the premise of 
Agency Theory.  
2.  ANALYSIS
This study employs case-study approach to deliberate its’ 
argument qualitatively. The analysis is divided into three 
sections. The first section contains the description of the 
Malaysian Companies Act provisions related to Malaysian 
director’s fiduciary duties and responsibilities. The second 
section consists of description of corporate cases in which 
the prescribed sections of the Malaysian Companies 
Act are assumed to be exercised. The cases provide 
background for the implementation of the specified 
provisions act as well as proving the concerned issue. 
The third section summarizes the issue by pondering into 
the area which reflects the existence of the inter-related 
relationship of ethic and governance. This part of analysis 
attempts to describe potential situation which would 
probably occur within such context and it does not reflect 
specific normative evaluation on the individual cases or 
subjects.      
2.1  Malaysia Companies Act 1965
The Companies Act 1965 is one of the important guides 
for corporate governance in Malaysia. This study focuses 
on sections which relate to the director’s fiduciaries duties. 
Table 1 show the relevant sections in the Malaysian 
Companies Act which are related to the company’s 
directors’ fiduciary duties.  
Section 131B(1) of the Malaysian Companies 
Act provides the highest responsibility of corporate 
governance to the directors. The responsibility is 
strengthen through the provision of Section 132(1F) 
which states that, although the directors has delegated 
their power to other parties the final responsibility and 
accountability remain with the directors. Thus, the 
directors are accountable to act in the best interest of the 
company at all times.   
Section 132(1) emphasizes the form in which the 
directors are obliged to render their power. The term 
“for a proper purpose” contains ethical imperative which 
require the directors to choose action which benefit to the 
organisation as a whole.  Sections 132(1A) emphasizes on 
the value of prudence and sincerity whenever the directors 
exercise their duties. The value contains in the terms 
of “reasonable care” and “diligence” in their business 
judgment in order to promote the best interest for the 
company.  
Section 132(1E) extends it highest concern for 
directors to act impartially in the best interest of the 
company in all situations. It focuses on the agency 
relationships that exist between the directors and their 
nominators, which possibly lead to some degree of 
directors’ partial consideration leaning towards the 
nominators’ interest. The ethical imperative of impartial 
consideration has remained in the statement of “..he shall 
not subordinate his duty to act in the best interest of the 
company to his duty to his nominator”.  
2.2  Corporate Cases
These cases highlight contextual framework to the 
Table 1 
Duties and Responsibilities of Directors Stipulated in the Malaysian Companies Act
No. Section
1 Section 131B(1)
2 Section 132 (1)
3 Section 132 (1A)
4 Section 132(1E)
5 Section 132(1F)
Description of provisions
The business and affairs of a company must be managed by, or under the directions of, the board 
of directors.
A director of a company shall at all times exercise his powers for a proper purpose and in good 
faith in the best interest of the company.  
A director of a company shall exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence with:
      a)The knowledge, skill and experience which may reasonably be expected of a director 
having the same responsibilities; and
        b)Any additional knowledge, skill and experience which the director in fact has.
A director, who was appointed by virtue of his position as an employee of a company, or who 
was appointed by or as a representative of a shareholder, employer or debenture holder, shall act 
in the best interest of the company and in the event of any conflict between his duty to act in the 
best interest of the company and his duty to his nominator, he shall not subordinate his duty to act 
in the best interest of the company to his duty to his nominator.
Except as is otherwise provided by this Act, the memorandum or articles of association of the 
company or any resolution of the board of directors or shareholders of the company, the directors 
may delegate any power of the board of directors or any other person and where the directors, 
directors, officer, employee, expert or any other person and where the directors have delegated 
any power, the directors are responsible for the exercise of such power by the delegates as if such 
power had been exercised by the directors themselves.  
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investigation of ethics-governance relationship.  
Case 1: Takeover of ABC Capital by AAA Bank
ABC Capital is a private listed company (PLC) in 
Malaysia. AAA Bank is the offeror for ABC takeover. 
The saga started with the ABC Capital board of director’s 
(BOD) decision for not tabling and rejecting the AAA 
offers- worth RM 4.92 billion or RM 7.10 per share on 
cash basis for the acquisition of ABC Capital. The offer 
was rejected due to the under-price reason. The ABC 
Capital BOD decision had been influenced by SSS Ltd 
who owned 20.2 percent of stake in ABC Capital. SSS 
Ltd. had bought their shares in ABC Capital at RM 9 per 
share. Meanwhile, there are other majority shareholders 
who were interested with the offer and keen of selling 
their stakes in the group. The three shareholders were 
Mr. R who owns 15.5 percent in ABC Capital, Mr. T 
(17.1 percent) and KM Ltd (10 percent). Their costs of 
investment were recorded at RM 2 for Mr. R and RM 6 
for Mr. T and KM Ltd.  
Mr. R who was interested with the AAA offer, had 
convened for ABC Capital extra-ordinary general meeting 
(EGM). The purpose of the EGM was to appoint eight (8) 
new directors to the current ABC board of directors. The 
proposed appointment would increase the board from 12 
directors to maximum of 15 directors. Under section 145 
of the Companies Act 1965, shareholders who hold at least 
10 percent of the voting rights in the company are allowed 
to call for an EGM. As a result, the majority shareholder 
had exercised his power to convene the EGM for electing 
the new directors. The new board of directors had finally 
tabled the revised takeover proposal in September 2010. 
Finally, the resolution for the takeover had been approved 
by the simple majority shareholders.  
Case 2: Takeover of YYY 
YYY group is the largest toll-express operator in South-
East Asia. YYY owns and operates 973 kilometres of 
inter-urban toll expressways in Malaysia stretching 
from the border of Thailand in the north to the border of 
Singapore in the south. On Oct 2010, MM Group and FEP 
(which also the government link entities) who already 
owned 68 percent shares in YYY, had proposed to buy all 
YYY businesses for RM 23 billions or RM 4.60 per share. 
At the same time, there are also other bidders who were 
interested with YYY business, such as GG who bid for 
RM 50 billion and UU for RM 26 billion.  
An important implication arises from the intention of 
a take-over is the effect on the target company’s stock 
price, especially when the bidder walk away from the 
proposal for whatever reason including unsatisfaction due 
diligence results. In such situation, the price and value of 
the target firm may plunge because of negative market 
reactions by market players. As in YYY case, the offerors 
had made their offer with was subjected to a satisfactory 
re-negotiation of the toll concession between YYY and 
the government.  In general, the concession re-negotiation 
would include the highway tariffs requirement. Thus, 
the BOD of YYY had required the bidders to place a 
deposit of RM 50 millions to the company. The purpose 
of the deposit was to compensate any potential negative 
consequences if the bidders choose to terminate the 
takeover deal.  In addition, the offerors were also required 
to show proof of their funding capacity. Finally, only FEP 
and MM manage to put the deposit of RM 50 millions and 
other bidders had left the deal.
Case 3: ZZZ  Malaysia Bank Proposed Take-over of 
JJJ  Bank
Due to global market expansion strategy, ZZZ Bank had 
entered an agreement to buy 56 percent of equity interest 
in JJJ  Bank in country A. The purchase price for the 56 
percent stake was worth RM 8.8 billion and RM 4.8 
billion had been paid in advance to execute the purchase 
deal. 
Due to global economic turnmoil, the capital market 
authority of country A had introduced strict regulation 
which required the liquidation of at least 20 percent of 
the foreign equity ownership to local public. Thus, the 
central bank instructed ZZZ Bank to hold the purchase 
and to negotiate for better acquisition price. Furthermore, 
the purchase price was reported to be at over-prices of 
20 percent from the real value of JJJ Bank. JJJ Bank also 
was reported to have high level of non-performing loan 
(NPL) and a low-level of deposits. However, the price re-
negotiation failed and the exercise period of the particular 
deal was due in September 2008.           
2.3  Analysis on Ethics-Governance Relationship
According to Section 131(B)(1) of Malaysian Companies 
Act, the directors are the responsible agents for handling 
the company’s affair. As stated in Section 132(1) and 
132(1A) of the Act, the directors shall act for the best 
interest for the company. Thus, all directors are expected 
to render impartial consideration and to avoid any conflict 
of interest at all times.  
Case 1: Takeover of ABC Capital by AAA  Bank
Analysis:  The independency of the new directors is 
the factor which may divert the execution of directors’ 
fiduciary duty from the solid reason of promoting the 
company’s interest. Hence, the element of “independency” 
is required for the inclusion of ethical value. The ethical 
motive may abstain element of partial consideration which 
potentially lean towards the interest of their nominator 
instead of the company. Although the requirement has 
been stated in Section 132(1E), the ability of the new 
elected directors to execute their power for the best 
interest of the companies’ interest is internally determined 
by their ability to be impartial.    
Case 2: Takeover of YYY 
Analysis:  Deposit and proof of funding may contain 
element that can be described as “for best interest of the 
company” as it allows only serious and credible bidders 
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to participate in the bidding, thus provides stability in 
company’s share price. However, it may also violates the 
requirement of “the best interest for the company” if the 
action was taken due to other motive. Unless it has been 
based on a truly ethical motive of “good faith”, the deposit 
requirement may serve as a strategy for eliminating other 
potential bidders rather than promoting the company’s 
best interest. As in this case, GG which offer the highest 
price of RM 50 billion offer via bonds instruments had 
been dropped from the list of potential bidders as GG was 
unable to place the deposit. The government link entities, 
the MM-FEP which already owned 68 percents equity in 
YYY has been secured as the sole bidder though it offered 
only RM 4.60 per shares. 
Case 3: ZZZ  Malaysia Bank Proposed Take-over of 
JJJ Bank
Analysis : The decision of ZZZ  board of directors to 
carry out the particular expansion strategy may or may 
not be in compliance of section 132(1) and 132(1A). It 
poses question has the expansion strategy been prudently 
analyzed in order to give good consequences for ZZZ as 
a whole? Section 132(1A) also emphasizes the prudence 
value in business decision-making. Unless the prudence 
value had been adopted throughout the decision-making, 
the strategy may not be in the best interest for the 
company.    
3.  DISCUSSION
Throughout the analysis, we found that ethical principle 
and governance have a very close relationship. The nature 
of the relationship can be describes as complementing 
rather than substituting one another. Implicitly, the ethical 
imperative has been associated through the word of 
“proper purpose”, “in good faith”, “in the best interest 
of the company”, “reasonable care” and “diligence”. 
Such ethical terms have been institutionalized in Section 
131B(1), 132(1), 132(1A) and 132(1E) of the Malaysia 
Companies Act. Although the particular sections have 
specified the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of the 
BOD as well as the way they should deliver their power 
and duties, however, some parts has remain in the form 
of subjective and relative considerations. For example, 
in Section 132(1), the directors are required to exercise 
their power for proper purpose and in good faith in 
the best interest of the company. The terms of “proper 
purpose” and “good faith” require ethical motive from 
the incumbent agents. The subjective area requires for 
execution of individual ethical principle. Therefore, the 
organization can create its various types of governance 
tools, but the governance effectiveness still relies on the 
power of individual ethics and integrity.  
This study reiterates Smith argument that moral 
motive must serve as the underlying premise for every 
human activities. In order to produce good consequences 
in human life, all human actions must originate from 
the moral sentiment. Within the context of directors’ 
fiduciary duties to the organizations and its’ stakeholders, 
the element of ‘prudence’ and ‘impartial consideration’ 
are utmost important. We further proposed that moral 
sentiment theory must be re-consider as the basic 
assumption in the interpretation of human economic or 
managerial behaviours. The laws and regulations are 
indeed important, but as far as effective rules-execution is 
concerned, the human factor will remain as the significant 
determinant of good governance. Regulations cannot 
substitute human wisdom and discretion, and thus it is 
important to nurture ethical competency among our future 
management practitioners so that moral standards are 
incorporated into business governance practices.  
CONCLUSION
This study concludes the close relationship between 
ethics and governance. Furthermore, ethics serves as the 
underlying premise for managerial actions. Thus, legal 
governance structure is indeed important. However, the 
rules are to be confined within the jurisdiction of ethical 
consideration as reflected through the terms of “proper 
purpose”, “in good faith”,“in the best interest of the 
company”,“reasonable care”and“diligence. This study 
also found that corporate governance mechanisms cannot 
isolate itself from its most fundamental pillars which 
confine in the form of ethical principles. It is not merely 
an issue of governance but also ethics. Nobody knows 
whether the “good faith” or the “best interest” had been 
served by any particular directors except themselves. 
Thus, ethical and self-regulated mechanisms which are 
derived internally must be upholds to all incumbent 
corporate agents.    
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